Religion plays an important role in the lives of many Americans. Over two-thirds of Americans belong to a church or other religious organization, and this has risen substantially over time. Two-fifths of Americans attend church in a typical week, and 95% profess belief in "the existence of God or a universal spirit" (Iannaccone, 1998) . Giving to religious causes accounts for more than two-thirds of all reported individual charitable contributions. Religiosity is not confined to particular income groups, racial groups, or locations in the U.S.: religious adherence and participation is widespread among all demographic groups.
Given this important role, few economists have studied the implications religiosity for economic outcomes. This is certainly not the case in other disciplines. Hundreds of articles in sociology, psychology, and medicine overwhelmingly document the positive impacts of religiosity on a wide variety of outcomes. Those few studies by economists have also found that religiosity, and in particular religious participation, is strongly associated with positive outcomes such as reduced frequency of socially deviant activities among youth.
The small literature on this topic in economics likely reflects the heightened sensitivity in our profession to the enormous difficulty inherent in separating the causal effects of religiosity from other factors that are correlated with outcomes. Most factors that determine the religiosity of any given individual are likely correlated with their outcomes through other channels as well. This is true of both short run factors that may cause fluctuations in religious devotion, such as particularly good or bad shocks to personal well-being, and long run factors that cause heterogeneity across individuals, such as correlation between religiosity and ambition or ability.
In this paper, I propose a potential solution to this long standing problem, by drawing on the literature on the sociology of religion. Starting with the influential work of Finke and Stark (1988) , this literature has posited and tested a host of hypotheses about how the structure of religious markets influences religiosity, and in particular religious participation. One factor that has been suggested as a determinant of religious participation is market density, or the share of the population in an area that is of an individual's religion. If a larger percentage of the local population shares your religion, you may get easier access to religious observation (a "distance" effect) or other social interactions that are related to religious participation.
I investigate the impact of market density on both religious participation and economic outcomes. The key insight that makes the analysis possible is that exogenous predictions of market density can be formed based on area ancestral mix. For a Catholic person of Italian extraction, living near persons of Polish extraction or living near persons of Swedish extraction is likely irrelevant for any aspect of life except for the distribution of religious preference in the area; a higher percentage will be Catholic if the neighboring group is Poles rather than Swedes. Thus, Italians who live near Poles will have a higher religious market density than Italians who leave near Swedes, yet they should be otherwise identical.
To model impacts of market density on religious participation, I rely on the General Social Survey (GSS), a nationally representative survey that collects data on religious preference and religious participation. For the outcomes analysis, I use the IPUMS sample of the 1990 Census. Of course, the Census in the U.S. does not ask about religious preference. But I can form a strong prediction of religious preference based on one's ancestral heritage, so that I can model outcomes as a function of the correlation of the religious preference of one's own heritage with the religious preference of other heritages that share one's area.
My results are striking. I find that a higher market density leads to a significantly increased level of religious participation, and as well to better outcomes according to several key economic indicators: higher levels of education and income, lower levels of welfare receipt and disability, higher levels of marriage, and lower levels of divorce. These results are robust to a variety of specification checks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section I, I review the literature on religiosity and outcomes, and on religious market structure and religiosity. In section II, I describe the data sources and empirical strategy for the analysis. Section III presents the main results, and section IV assesses their robustness to alternative interpretations. Section V concludes.
Section I: Background

Religiosity and Outcomes
An enormous literature documents a positive cross-sectional association between religious participation, or other measures of "religiosity", and outcomes. The earliest claim of such a relationship is likely Durkheim's 1897 study of the role of religiosity and suicide rates. Durkheim found that suicide rates were lower in the more socially integrated Catholic communities than in less integrated Protestant areas. He attributed this difference not to Catholic teachings on suicide, but rather to the "tendency of Catholicism to promote integration through ritual and community, and to regulate standards of faith, piety, and moral conduct" (Ellison et al, Burr, 1997) . Another early contributor was Weber, whose 1908 work (as referenced by Iannacconne, 1998) claimed that the industrial revolution was made possible by the Protestant Reformation.
A large volume of subsequent work studies the impact of religiosity on many different outcomes, which I can review only incompletely; I provide some sample citations here. One area of significant focus is deviant behaviors, with more frequent religious participation and increased religiosity being associated with lower levels of adult criminal behavior, at both the individual level (e.g. Evans et al, 1995) and the area level (Lipford et al, 1993; Hull and Bold, 1995) , and with lower levels of substance abuse (e.g. National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2001 ). A parallel literature shows the retarding effects of religious participation and religiosity on deviant behavior of many types among youths (e.g. Bachman et al, 2002; Wallace and Williams, 1987) . A notable contribution to this literature among economists is Freeman (1986) , who finds that churchgoing among young black males favorably affects the allocation of time, school attendance, work activity, and the (in) frequency of socially deviant activity. Freeman highlights the problems with interpreting causally these types of results, but he notes that "the pattern of statistical results suggests that at least some part of the churchgoing effect is the result of actual causal impact".
Another major area of emphasis of the existing literature is the impacts of religious participation and religiosity on health status. Levin and Vanderpool (1987) and Hummer et al, (1999) review this literature, documenting a consistently strong relationship between religiosity, usually proxied by religious participation, and health status/outcomes. Hummer et al. extend this literature by using matched death record data at the individual level to show a negative relationship between religious participation and mortality. Levin's (1994) more critical review concludes that while these associations are valid, no convincing evidence shows that they are causal.
Another literature documents a very strong correlation between religiosity and self-reported measures of well-being (Ellison, 1991; Hout and Greeley, 2003) . Gruber and Mullainathan (2002) find that the effect on self-reported happiness of moving from never attending to attending weekly is comparable to the happiness effect of moving from the bottom to the top income quartile. In addition, religiosity is associated with more marital stability (e.g. Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993) .
Fewer studies measure the impact of religiosity on more standard economic measures of outcomes. A large literature on religious preference and earnings (Tomes, 1985) finds a large advantage for Jews in terms of both earnings and return to human capital, with mixed rankings for other religions. I am not aware of any work on religious participation and earnings or other income measures.
While this large literature has often recognized the difficulties of assigning causal interpretations to these positive impacts of religiosity, it provides no fully satisfactory resolution to this problem. Those articles that are most sensitive to this issue try to address it using either rich background controls or longitudinal analysis of changes in religious participation, but neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory.
Religious Market Structure and Religiosity
The literature on religious market structure and religiosity, which is almost exclusively found in sociology, owes it origins to Adam Smith. In a largely ignored chapter in The Wealth of Nations, "Smith argued that self-interest motivates clergy just as it does secular producers; that market forces constrain churches just as they constrain secular firms; and that the benefits of competition, the burdens of monopoly, and the hazards of government regulation are as real for religion as for any other sector of the economy" (Iannaccone, 1998) . This line of argument has formed the basis for a number of analyses by the sociologists Stark (e.g. Finke and Stark, 1988, 1992) , who argued that empirical evidence favors the proposition that more religious competition promotes religiosity.
A large subsequent literature has evaluated these claims, with mixed results.
1 Recent critical reviews in Chaves and Gorski (2001) and Voas et al (2002) question the contention that more competition leads to more religiosity. Voas et al., in particular, question the entire empirical framework that has been used to test this contention, highlighting the mathematical linkage between the church membership data used to measure religious competition and the same (or similar) data used to measure rates of religious adherence.
A smaller literature has focused on the question of how religious densities affect religiosity, and only three studies directly model church attendance as a function of density; Phillips (1998) and Olson (1998) find that higher density is associated with more attendance, while Perl and Olson (2000) find no significant association. Other studies that model religious charitable giving as a function of religious market density find a negative association (Zaleski and Zech, 1995; Perl and Olson, 2000) . This is very consistent with the findings in Gruber (2004) , who shows a negative association between religious attendance and religious charitable contributions. If attendance and contributions are substitutes, and more density raises attendance, it may lower contributions. Thus, this set of findings is consistent with a positive effect of religious market density on religious attendance.
Section II: Data and Empirical Strategy Data
I rely on two data sources for this analysis. The first is the General Social Survey (GSS), a nationally representative survey carried out in most years from 1973 through 2000, with roughly 1500-2000 households interviewed in each year. These data have information on location (Primary Sampling Unit, or PSU, which is roughly equivalent to Metropolitan Statistical Area, or MSA), religious participation/religiosity, ethnic heritage, demographics, and economic/social outcomes. This analysis include all non-hispanic whites age 25 or older. I focus on non-hispanic whites only because of very strong evidence of racial segregation in church going, so that the density of hispanics or nonwhites in a religion in some area is not likely to be relevant for the religious participation of whites in that area.
Religious affiliation has many possible definitions ranging from very general to very detailed. I use a fairly broad categorization for this work, dividing individuals into seven groups: Catholics, Jews, Liberal Protestants, Moderate Protestants, Conservative Protestants, Other, and None. This is the finest breakdown that is feasible, given the empirical strategy described below. The GSS reports data on roughly 150 denominations and subdenominations, and I use the classification from Roof & McKinney (1987) to divide the sample into these groups.
2 The questions on religious affiliation have changed over time in the GSS, with a major revision in 1984, when detail was added on a host of Protestant denominations. For this analysis, I therefore rely on data from 1984 forward.
The main dependent variable in the GSS for this analysis is religious attendance. The GSS asks respondents about their frequency of religious attendance, with nine possible responses: never; less than once per year; about once or twice a year; several times a year; about once a month; two to three times a month; nearly every week; every week; and several times a week. For the basic analysis below, I simply use the linear index formed by these responses (with values 0 through 8), thereby implicitly assuming an equal impact for each unit change in the attendance index. Since each unit is roughly twice the previous unit in frequency of attendance, this is roughly equivalent to a log scale in times attending. But I show as well the effects of alternative formulations below.
The second is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS) of the 1990 census. These data contain information for a 5% sample of the population on a variety of socioeconomic characteristics. I once again use a sample of non-hispanic whites ages 25 and older for this analysis. I use several measures of economic well-being as the dependent variable: the log of household income; the log of the ratio of household income to the poverty line (using the poverty-line normalization for family size); years of education; categories of 2 Liberal Protestants include, for example, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and the United Congregational Church/Unitarian-Universalists.
Moderate Protestants include Methodists, Lutherans, and Non-Southern Baptists. Conservative Protestants include Southern Baptists, Pentecostals, and other Evangelical denominations. educational attainment (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, college graduate); whether the respondent is working; whether the respondent's spouse is working; whether the family receives welfare payments; whether the respondent is disabled; whether the respondent is married or divorced; and the number of children in the respondent's household.
Empirical Strategy -GSS Religious Attendance Estimates
I initially estimate models of religious attendance as a function of religious market density:
where: i indexes persons, a indexes areas, and t indexes years R is religious attendance RELIGDENS is the % of the population in the area that is of individual i's religion ANCESDENS, AGESDENS are parallel measures of density of ancestry group and age/sex group 3 ANCES, AGES, and RELIG are fixed effects for the individual's ancestry, age/sex, and religion AREA and YEAR are fixed effects for area and year
This specification provides a "differences-in-differences" estimate of the impact of religious market density on own participation. Market density is simply the percentage of each PSU in the GSS that is of each of the seven religious groups. By including market and religious preference fixed effects, I control for differences across groups and areas in their religiosity. Area-wide factors that cause differences in religious participation (such as history or weather) are held constant, as are any religion-wide factors that are associated with religious participation (level of "devotion"). Such a regression asks, for example: do Catholics attend church more when the area is a higher percentage Catholic, relative to Protestants in the same area, and relative to Catholics in other areas with a lower percentage Catholic? A positive effect of religious density on religious participation would be indicated by a positive coefficient.
Even in this differences-in-differences framework, three potential problems may arise with the analysis. The first is classical measurement error; given the small GSS sample sizes, I am measuring denominational density in an area fairly imprecisely.
Second, in addition, market density could have systematic measurement error. If individuals who participate more in religious activities are also more likely to report their religious affiliation in a survey (e.g. as opposed to saying that they are not religious), it may cause a direct spurious link between religious participation and religious density. Third, even conditional on these fixed effects, market density may be capturing majority status effects. That is, possibly, it is not being part of a large religious group, but rather being part of a large group per se, that determines religious attendance.
My approach to addressing these problems is to create an instrument for religious density that is based on one's ancestry, and the ancestries of others in the area, rather than on religion per se. In particular, the instrument takes the following form:
where n indexes ancestries, r indexes religions, and a indexes areas PRDEN na is predicted religious density for ancestry group n in area a P rn is the distribution of religious preferences r within each ancestry n ANCES na is the density of each ancestral group n in each area a This measure, PRDEN, is formed in two steps. First, for each ancestry, I multiply the density of that ancestry in an area times the probability that the ancestry is of a given religion. Summing these, the final term in expression (2) gives me the predicted density of each religion in each area. Second, I take a weighted average of this expression across religions within an ancestry, to measure the predicted religious density for any ancestral group n in an area a. That is, I am modeling directly the outcome of an ancestral group in an area as a function of the shared religious preferences of other ancestral groups that reside in an area. So Italians that live with Poles and Irish will have a high value; Italians that live near Swedes and French will have a low value. The Appendix provides a detailed example to illustrate this methodology.
This approach solves the problems of measurement error noted above, since this predicted religious density is not based on actual stated religious preferences, but rather on the ethnic makeup of the area. By including own ancestral density and age/sex density in the regression, I also address the concern about identifying solely the impacts of majority status. Of course, I am only including own ancestrial density linearly in the regression, while it enters nonlinearly into the computation of PRDEN, so this linear control may not be sufficient. To address this, I actually exclude one's own ancestral group when I compute PRDEN. That is, PRDEN measures, given your area and ancestral group, the likelihood that you live with others of your same religion, based on the other (but not own) ancestral groups in that area.
Both the GSS and Census ask respondents for a single ancestry, and, if that is not possible, for a primary and secondary ancestry. I define the primary ancestry as either the single ancestry or the primary ancestry given. To address issues of segregation, I only use data on those ancestries from Europe or Canada in the analysis. That is, I exclude from the analysis any individual whose ancestry is not European or Canadian. 4 To measure ancestral densities by area as precisely as possible, I use the STF 3A files from the Census. These files provide, for each county, the demographic characteristics for the full sample of individuals who filled out the Census long form. I use the counties in the STF 3A files to build up the MSAs in the census, and the PSUs in the GSS. For each MSA and PSU, I compute the share of the area that is of each ancestral group, and the share of the area that is of each age/sex group. To measure the religious distribution of each ancestral group, I use the GSS data to compute the percentage of each ancestry that is of each of the seven religious categories.
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Empirical Strategy -Outcomes
While the GSS data are ideal for examining effects on religious participation, they are not ultimately useful for modeling the impact of religiosity on outcomes in this market structure approach. The sample is sufficiently small that the estimates from doing so are very imprecise. Therefore, to model outcomes, I turn to the IPUMS data. Of course, the IPUMS has no information on religious preference. But, it does include data on ancestry, akin to the data provided in the GSS. And the instrument in the GSS, PRDEN, does not ultimately rely on religious preference, but rather only on ancestry and area. Thus, I use data on the religious preferences of each ancestry from the GSS, and on ancestral densities by MSA from the STF 3A data, to compute PRDEN for each ancestry/MSA combination in the Census. That is, one benefit of this identification strategy is that I need not have actual religious preference data; having information on ancestry is sufficient to identify the model. The Census regression is therefore just the reduced form version of the GSS instrumental variables regression. These regressions model outcomes (e.g. income) as a function of whether individuals live near other ancestries that share their religious preference.
The relevant level of variation for the IPUMS data is at the ancestry/MSA level. Thus, I collapse these data into ancestry/MSA cells for the analysis, and weight the regression by the number of observations in the cell.
In the context of the outcomes analysis, the coefficient has two plausible interpretations. The first is that an increase in market density of one's religion in one's area changes one's level of religious participation. The second is that those who are more religious move to areas with a higher density of their religion. In terms of finding a valid instrument for the impacts of religious participation on outcomes, the exact causal mechanism is not relevant; what is critical is simply that both mechanisms are otherwise independent of outcomes. But this may not be true with the selection mechanism. In particular, it may be that those who move to areas with a higher density of their religion (or those who don't move out of such areas) are different, on average, from those who do not. This could arise, for example, if everyone desires to live with those of their own religion, but moving is costly, so only higher income individuals can undertake such a move on the margin. This case, would imply a systematic bias towards finding a positive correlation between religious market density and income.
Of course, the opposite story is also plausible, that the lowest income individuals are the ones who move to be with others of their religion. Indeed, based on the past literature on ethnic agglomeration, this opposite story seems the natural alternative. As reviewed in Edin et al. (2003) , past studies tend to find that those who live with others of their same ethnic group are worse off than those who are not "ghetto-ized" in this way. Edin et al. propose a novel solution to this problem, using the random assignment of refugee groups in Sweden, to show a true positive causal effect of ethnic agglomeration on outcomes. In a crosssection, however, the past literature would suggest a negative selection bias to the estimates. Thus, the effect of potential selection bias on the estimates is not clear. I discuss below an approach to addressing the sign of this bias using individuals who do and do not move from their state of birth. 
Means
The means from the GSS and IPUMS data sets, at the PSU or MSA level, are presented in Table 1 . In the GSS, the typical respondent lives in an area where roughly one-quarter of the population shares his general religious preference, although the variance is large. The instrument, PRDEN, has a slightly lower mean of 0.195, with a much smaller standard deviation. 6 Roughly one in six persons in the typical person's area shares their same ancestry, and fewer than one in twenty shares the same age/sex grouping. The mean of the attendance index (on a scale from 0, no attendance, to 8, attend more than once per week) is 3.83. In the IPUMS data, the mean and variance of PRDEN is similar to the GSS, as are ancestral densities; the age/sex density is somewhat higher. Table 2 presents the results for the impacts of market density on religious attendance in the GSS. The Table shows only the coefficients of interest, those on RELIGDENS, ANCESDENS, and ASDENS, from regressions that include all the controls shown in equation (1) above. The first column shows the OLS relationship, which is strongly positive: increases in the density of one's religion in one's area increases the frequency of religious attendance. The point estimate suggests that each ten percentage point increase in religious density is associated with a 0.013 unit increment in the attendance index. Recall that the attendance index is roughly a log scale, so that one unit represents a doubling in frequency of attendance. This implies that a 10 percentage point rise in religious density raises religious attendance by 1.3%.
Section III: Results
GSS Results
The second column shows the impact of instrumenting religious density using PRDEN the prediction for religious density based on area ancestral mix. Doing so substantially increases the coefficient, to 0.845; that is, each 10 percentage point increase in density raises attendance by 0.085 index point, or 8.5%. The next two rows show the impact of area ancestral density and age/sex density on religious attendance. Ancestral density has a very modest and statistically insignificant effect; having more individuals around of your ancestry group does not much impact attendance. This is striking, given the strong IV results in the second column, which are based on the density of other ancestral groups in the area. That is, living with others of your own ethnic group has little effect on religious attendance, but living with others of complementary ethnic groups that share your religion has a large positive effect.
This finding suggests particular effects of having more individuals around of your own ancestry, as opposed to "complementary" ancestries that share your religion, that offset the positive effects of religious density. For Italians, For example, having more Poles and more Italians in the area increases the density of Catholics and thereby increases religious participation. But the additional Italians also reduce participation, perhaps because there are other cultural functions that are served outside of the religious setting. This is consistent with the census outcomes results which show negative effects of higher own ethnic density in the area. Age/sex density has a much stronger effect; having more individuals in your age/sex group significantly increases the rate of religious participation.
One concern with the results presented thus far is that some individuals in the GSS report their religion as "none". While about one-third of this group does report attending religious services, it is not clear if they should be included in the regression. I exclude them in the bottom panel, and the results are very similar to those reported above.
An additional concern is that the measure of religious participation is a crude one. In Table 3 , I therefore explore two alternative measures. First, I replace the index values with their frequency-weighted counterparts.
7 As the first row of Table 3 shows, the effect remains significant with this alternative formulation, implying that each 10 percentage point increase in density leads to 0.95 more days of church attendance. Second, I estimate separate IV (linear probability) models for each of the individual attendance category dummies. While few of these coefficients are significant, they show a clear and consistent pattern of reductions in the low attendance categories, and increases in the high attendance categories. The reduction in the odds of never attending, and the increase in the odds of attending at least weekly are particularly strong. 7 That is, I convert the values as follows: no attendance = 0; less than annual attendance = 1; once or twice a year = 2; several times a year = 4; monthly = 12; two or three times per month = 30; almost every week = 40; weekly = 52; two or three times per week = 130. Table 4 presents the results for outcomes using the IPUMS data, which is, as noted, collapsed to the ancestry/MSA level. Each row shows the coefficients on PRDEN defined in equation (2), as well as the density of own ancestry and own age/sex group in the MSA. The results show a very strong positive correlation between predicted own religious density and positive economic outcomes. The coefficient shows that each ten percent increase in predicted own religious density leads to a 0.91 percent increase in household income. Normalized by the poverty scale, a ten percent increase in predicted own density leads to a 0.55 percent increase in income as a fraction of the poverty line. The lower result in the second row implies that density is positively associated with family size, as we will see to be the case below.
IPUMS Results
The results from the GSS analysis can be used here to form an implicit IV estimate of the effects of religious attendance on outcomes. The coefficient on PRDEN in a reduced form model of attendance in the GSS is 1.077 (0.351); that is, moving from a PRDEN of 0 to a PRDEN of 1 doubles the frequency of attendance (a one unit increase in the attendance index). Putting this together with the census results, it implies that doubling the frequency of attendance leads to a 9.1% increase in household income, or a rise of 5.5% as a fraction of the poverty line.
This implicit IV estimate is an overstatement, however, to the extent that other aspects of religiosity are affected by religious density, and affect outcomes. For example, more religious density may lead not only to more attendance, but also to more fervent religious beliefs, which themselves impact outcomes. Indeed, the GSS has strong positive effects of density on the intensity of religious beliefs (IV coefficient of 0.133 (0.054)), and on belief in the afterlife (IV coefficient 0.128 (0.076)). These effects may be an outcome of increased participation, or they may be a direct impact of being in an environment where more individuals share your religion. To the extent that the latter is the case, then the implicit IV calculations presented here are overstating the effects of attendance per se (since they also build in the effects of religious beliefs as well).
The coefficient on ancestry density in these regressions is negative, suggesting that a higher density of own ancestry leads to lower, not higher, incomes. This is consistent with the literature on ethnic concentration reviewed earlier, which reported that ethnic segregation is associated with worse outcomes, (in standard observational models). Once again, this makes it even more striking that I find positive effects of PRDEN: while being near others of your own ancestral group is negatively associated with outcomes, being near others of ancestral groups that share your religion is positively associated with outcomes.
Being near others of the same age/sex group is also negatively associated with outcomes.
The next five rows explore the impact of predicted religious density on education. I first examine total years of education, and find a highly significant positive effect, whereby each 10 percentage point increase in predicted religious density is associated with 0.05 more years of education. Thus, once again using the result from the GSS, this finding suggests that doubling religious participation raises education by roughly 0.5 years. This result arises from large reductions in the odds of being a high school dropout or only having a high school degree, and increases in some college attendance or college graduation in particular.
The next two rows examine effects on own and spousal employment. No noticeable effect on the odds that respondents are employed, although spousal employment is significantly higher; this effect likely arises through the effects on marriage noted below (since spousal employment is zero either if spouses do not work or individuals are unmarried). The odds of the family receiving welfare income are significantly reduced; this effect is quite large, implying (given the GSS findings) that doubling the rate of attendance is associated with a 0.4% reduction in the odds of receiving welfare, or 16% of baseline receipt rates. It has a negative, but only marginally significant, reduction in the odds of being disabled.
The next two rows examine marital status. It has a significant positive association between predicted religious density and the odds of being married, and a significant negative association with the odds of being divorced. The former implies that doubling the rate of attendance leads to a 4.4% increase in the odds of being married; the latter implies that this same doubling leads to a 4.0% reduction in the odds of being divorced. Finally, a strong positive association with the number of children, which is consistent with the rise in the odds of marriage.
Overall, these IPUMS results are very consistent with a positive effect of religious participation on economic measures of well-being. Higher religious density, which is associated with more religious attendance, is also associated with higher incomes, more education, higher family labor supply, lower rates of welfare receipt, a higher odds of marriage, and a lower odds of divorce.
Section IV: Alternative Interpretations
The results thus far have shown is a very strong positive correlation between religious market density, as proxied by ancestral densities in an area, and both religious attendance and positive census outcomes. Given the striking nature of these findings, I turn now a host of specification tests designed to explore the robustness of my finding to alternative explanations.
Before doing so, it is important to recall the wide set of alternative interpretations that are already ruled out by the results to this point. The models estimated above include area fixed effects, so the analysis controls for any explanation based on general differences across areas. That is, these findings do not simply indicate that more religious areas have better outcomes, but rather that outcomes are better for groups that have more individuals of their religion (through complementary ancestries) in their area, relative to other groups in that same area with fewer individuals of their religion.
The model includes own ethnic density (which is also excluded from the computation of PRDEN), so the analysis controls for any explanation based on within-ethnic group spillovers. Moreover, the coefficient on own ethnic density generally has the opposite sign from the coefficient on PRDEN. The only alternatives that can explain these results, therefore, are ones where the density of other ancestral groups that share one's religion, but not the density of one's own ethnic group, cause positive outcomes.
Spillovers from "Nearby" Ancestral Groups
One such alternative is that, even though I control for own religious density, "nearby" ancestry groups have other spillover effects. That is, even controlling for the number of Swedish in an area, the number of Norwegians in the area may affect behavior in manners beyond religious spillovers, e.g. through other sources of Scandinavian group interaction.
I address this in two ways. First, just as I control for own group density in the model, I can also control for density of groups in your region of the world. I divide the ancestral groups into four for this exercise: Commonwealth/Englishspeaking nations; Northern Europe; Western Europe; and Eastern Europe. The results of including this control are shown in the third column of Table 2 for the GSS. Adding this control has little effect on the estimated coefficient on religious density. The control itself is negative, but insignificant. The effect of adding this control in the IPUMS is shown in the second and third columns of Table 5 ; the first column provides the base case results from Table 4 for comparison. It is clear that adding this control has little substantive effect on the results; if anything, they become somewhat stronger. The area density itself is typically opposite signed from PRDEN, which is similar to the own ancestry coefficient.
A more rigorous approach is to define religious density exclusive of all ancestries in one's region of the world. That is, I recompute density based only on that set of ancestries that are not in a given ancestry's region (akin to excluding one's own ancestry from the original computation of PRDEN). This provides a measure of density that is completely independent not only of a group's own ancestry, but also of the ancestries of all geographically nearby groups. Table shows coefficients of interest from regressions such as equation (1) in text. In addition to covariates shown, models include ancestral density, age/sex density, and fixed effects for age/sex, ancestry, religious preference, PSU, and year. Standard errors are in parentheses. First column shows PRDEN coefficients from Table 4 , for coefficient of interest; each row is a separate regression. Second and third columns show PRDEN and area density coefficients from regressions that add control for percent of individuals in PSU that are from individual's area of the world; fourth column recomputes PRDEN to exclude those individuals.
The results of this exercise are shown in the final column of Table 2 (for  GSS) , and the fourth column of Table 5 (for IPUMS) . Once again, even this more rigorous approach to dealing with potential spillovers has little impact on the findings from either data set.
Do Results Reflect Religious Participation Only?
The results thus far indicate fairly strongly that living near religiously complementary ancestral groups is associated with a higher rate of religious participation, and with better economic outcomes. These findings, however, do not necessarily establish that the mechanism translating higher complementary ancestral density to outcomes is through religious participation. It may be, for example, that higher complementary ancestral density leads to more civic participation in general, not only through religious participation.
This alternative seems unlikely, since the key regressor is based on groups that share a group's religious makeup, not other factors that drive civic participation. Nevertheless, I can explore this alternative in the GSS by using the available data on other measures of "social capital". The GSS collects data on whether the respondent is a member of one of a set of organizations. I use as a dependent variable both a dummy variable for belonging to any organization, and the count of the number of organizations to which the individual belongs. If PRDEN is simply capturing some unobserved source of social capital in an area, then we would expect these coefficients to be positive, as we see for attendance. (1) in text. In addition to religious density, models include ancestral density, age/sex density, and fixed effects for age/sex, ancestry, religious preference, PSU, and year. Each cell shows coefficient from a separate regression, where dependent variable is listed in the first column. Standard errors are in parentheses, variable mean in square brackets, and number of observations at bottom of each cell.
In fact, as Table 6 shows, both coefficients are negative, although neither is significant. I also show in this table the means and number of observations for these variables. These estimates are fairly imprecise, relative to the sample means. But there is certainly no evidence of increases in other social capital. Indeed, if I estimate separate models for every group membership, the only two coefficients that are positive are for membership in a professional organization and membership in a church group (although neither is significant); the other 12 membership coefficients are all negative.
Are Results Driven by Selection?
As noted earlier, the findings presented thus far: have two possible explanations that the evolution of religious density in one's area changes religious participation and outcomes; and that those with more religious participation move to areas with a higher density of their religion. And, as noted, in terms of finding a valid instrument for the impacts of religious participation on outcomes, the exact causal mechanism is not relevant; what is critical is simply that both mechanisms are otherwise independent of outcomes. But the selection mechanism is likely not independent of outcomes. As noted, the bias is not obvious ex ante.
It is difficult definitively to rule out selection as an explanation for these results, but one test is quite suggestive: examine the results for movers. An implication of the selection explanation for these results is that they should be found more strongly among those who are moving into an area than for those already living in the area.
An extreme thought experiment is helpful here. Suppose that individuals in the U.S. were assigned randomly to a place to live many generations ago, and were not allowed to move. Suddenly, for the current generation interviewed in the 1990 Census, individuals were allowed one move at age 25. This case would provide a clean test for selection bias. Among movers, any measured effect on outcomes at age 26 (immediately after moving is allowed) of an increase in religious density, representing an improved match, would be pure selection. That is, a finding that those who move to places with a better religious match have better outcomes could not reflect the causal effect of the better match, since outcomes at age 26 are determined solely by place of birth. Rather, such a finding would reflect the fact that higher quality individuals are moving to where the match is better. In other words, if the effect of religious density is truly causal, then any change in religious density for movers should be irrelevant to their outcomes, since their outcomes at age 26 should be fully determined by their place of birth. If an increase in religious density is associated with better outcomes, it occurs through selection.
Of course, we do not have this type of clean experiment. In this section, I approximate such a test by examining the correlation between outcomes and the change in religious density for those who move from their state of birth to some new state. Such an approximation has two offsetting biases relative to the thought experiment. First, if all selection has occurred in previous generations (something ruled out by assumption in the extreme thought experiment), then it will not be reflected in a test on movers in the current generation, biasing the test statistic towards zero. So long as some selection is ongoing with the current generation, however, the test will still provide the correct sign, if not magnitude. Second, since movers have moved at some point since birth, if religious density has a true positive causal effect, then the improved match may be reflected in their expost outcomes even absent selection. This will bias the test towards finding selection, and this problem cannot be fixed since the age that individuals moved is unknown.
To implement this test, I measure PRDEN at the state, rather than the MSA level. I then reestimate the Census models just for individuals who have moved from their state of birth, modeling their outcomes as a function of the change in PRDEN between their state of birth and their current state. The positive selection story would predict a strong positive coefficient on this change: those who move to improved matches (higher PRDEN) would be those with the best outcomes. I include in this model the change in ancestry and age/sex density between state and birth and state of residence, as well as a full set of fixed effects for both state of birth and state of residence.
The result of these regressions is shown in the first column of Table 7 . Strikingly, the signs for virtually all of the regressions are now the opposite of those from the earlier regressions: those who move from their birth state to another state with a higher PRDEN have worse outcomes along most dimensions. What has significant negative coefficients for income, education and employment, and significant positive coefficients for disability and welfare receipt. The results for marriage and divorce are also opposite signed (negative effects on marriage, positive on divorce), although not statistically significant. This suggests bias from negative selection among movers: those who move to better matches in terms of religious density are actually worse on average than those who do not.
To confirm this point, the second column in Table 7 shows the results (at the state level) for those who remain in their state of birth. Here, the results are generally positive and larger than those found earlier. The exceptions is marriage, where the effect is not significant, divorce, where the effect is significant but weaker than in Table 4 , and number of children, where the effect is now negative. Thus, consistent with the literature on ethnic segregation, negative selection appears to be at work among movers, which leads to understatement of the overall positive effect of religious density on outcomes. 
Section V: Conclusions
Religion remains an important aspect of life in the U.S. Yet very little is known about the impacts the religious participation has on economic outcomes. I have attempted to remedy this shortcoming by instrumenting for religious density with the extent to which others in an area share one's religious heritage, and to study the impact of religious density on outcomes in the Census IPUMS data. The findings of this analysis are striking: a higher density of your religion in your area, as proxied by the ancestral mix of area residents, leads to significantly more religious participation, and to better outcomes along a variety of dimensions, such as education, income, and marital status. These effects are sizeable, and they are robust to a variety of specification checks. In addition, they do not appear to be driven by selection of higher ability individuals into areas with more density of their religion. This paper has not at all investigated the mechanisms behind these findings. Several candidate explanations could be explored in future work. One is social capital effects: being near those of one's religion could increase the total number of social interactions, and this can have positive effects of the kind emphasized by the social capital literature (e.g. Glaeser, et al, 2000; Putnam, 2000) . Given the negative effects of being near one's own ethnic group, however, this a particular channel of social capital must work through interactions in religious settings. A second and related channel could be insurance provision. Religious institutions may operate as both financial and emotional insurers during negative shocks, improving overall welfare through filling missing markets for financial capital or other forms of support. This interpretation is supported in a developing country context by Chen (2003) , who finds that those most affected by the Indonesian financial crisis of the 1990s were most likely to increase their degree of religious intensity, but that this effect was mitigated by the availability of other forms of credit.
A third channel could be through religious education: a higher religious density could lead to more attendance at religious schools, and this could have a positive effect on long run outcomes. Neal (1997) shows that Catholic children are more likely to attend Catholic schools if more Catholics are nearby. Whether this leads to better outcomes is a source of some contention in the literature, as Altonji, et al (2002) review.
Finally, it is possible that more religious faith improves well-being directly. For example, those with more faith may be less "stressed out" about daily problems that impede success in the labor market and the marriage market, and are therefore more successful. Tests to separate out this and the other channels would be quite useful for explaining the results in this paper.
Appendix: Illustrating PRDEN Computation
This appendix provides an illustrative example of the computation of the PRDEN measure that is the centerpiece of the empirical strategy used in this paper. I consider a very simplified example of two ancestries (Italian and English), two religions (Catholic and Protestant), and two areas.
As the first row of Appendix Table 1 shows, 80% of Italians are Catholic, but only 10% of English are. The first row in the second panel of the table shows, likewise, that 20% of Italians are Protestant, and 90% of the English are. In this example, we consider two fictional areas: 60% of the population in Area 1 is Italian, and 40% is English; in Area 2, 20% of the population is Italian and 80% is English.
This Table computes the terms in the last part of expression (2), by multiplying the ancestral religious distribution times ancestral population distributions in an area to obtain a predicted religious density. Thus, from these figures, we predict that 52% of Area 1 will be Catholic, with 48% of the population Protestant; 24% of Area 2 is predicted to be Catholic, and 76% is predicted to be Protestant. That is, since Area 1 is slightly more Italian, it is predicted to be slightly more Catholic; since Area 2 is much more English, it is predicted to be much more Protestant.
Appendix Table 2 then takes this information, and uses it to compute PRDEN, the predicted religious density of each area for each ancestry. In Area 1, for example, 52% of the population is predicted to be Catholic, and 80% of Italians are Catholic; 48% of the population is predicted to be Protestant, and 20% of Italians are Protestant. As a result, for Italians in Area 1, on average 52% of the population will be of their same religion. For the English in Area 1, on average 48% of the population will be of their same religion. In Area 2, only 34% of the population will be of the same religion as the Italians in that area, but 70% of the population will be of the same religion as the English in that area.
These results illustrate the sources of variation in PRDEN. The more highly segregated areas are into ancestral groups that are themselves religiously segregated, the larger will be the variance in PRDEN. So, there is much more variance in PRDEN in Area 2, since that location is more heavily segregated, and the dominant group (English) are strongly segregated into Protestantism. 
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